Abstract-The delay-tolerant-network (DTN) model is becoming a viable communication alternative to the traditional infrastructural model for modern mobile consumer electronics equipped with short-range communication technologies such as Bluetooth, NFC, and Wi-Fi Direct. Proximity malware is a class of malware that exploits the opportunistic contacts and distributed nature of DTNs for propagation. Behavioral characterization of malware is an effective alternative to pattern matching in detecting malware, especially when dealing with polymorphic or obfuscated malware. In this paper, we first propose a general behavioral characterization of proximity malware which based on naive Bayesian model, which has been successfully applied in non-DTN settings such as filtering email spams and detecting botnets. We identify two unique challenges for extending Bayesian malware detection to DTNs ("insufficient evidence versus evidence collection risk" and "filtering false evidence sequentially and distributedly"), and propose a simple yet effective method, look ahead, to address the challenges. Furthermore, we propose two extensions to look ahead, dogmatic filtering, and adaptive look ahead, to address the challenge of "malicious nodes sharing false evidence." Real mobile network traces are used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed methods.
Ç

INTRODUCTION
T HE popularity of mobile consumer electronics, like laptop computers, PDAs, and more recently and prominently, smartphones, revives the delay-tolerantnetwork (DTN) model as an alternative to the traditional infrastructure model. The widespread adoption of these devices, coupled with strong economic incentives, induces a class of malware that specifically targets DTNs. We call this class of malware proximity malware.
An early example of proximity malware is the Symbianbased Cabir worm, which propagated as a Symbian Software Installation Script (.sis) package through the Bluetooth link between two spatially proximate devices [1] . A later example is the iOS-based Ikee worm, which exploited the default SSH password on jailbroken [2] iPhones to propagate through IP-based Wi-Fi connections [3] . Previous researches [4] quantify the threat of proximity malware attack and demonstrate the possibility of launching such an attack, which is confirmed by recent reports on hijacking hotel Wi-Fi hotspots for drive-by malware attacks [5] . With the adoption of new short-range communication technologies such as NFC [6] and Wi-Fi Direct [7] that facilitate spontaneous bulk data transfer between spatially proximate mobile devices, the threat of proximity malware is becoming more realistic and relevant than ever.
Proximity malware based on the DTN model brings unique security challenges that are not present in the infrastructure model. In the infrastructure model, the cellular carrier centrally monitors networks for abnormalities; moreover, the resource scarcity of individual nodes limits the rate of malware propagation. For example, the installation package in Cabir and the SSH session in Ikee, which were used for malware propagation, cannot be detected by the cellular carrier. However, such central monitoring and resource limits are absent in the DTN model. Proximity malware exploits the opportunistic contacts and distributed nature of DTNs for propagation.
A prerequisite to defending against proximity malware is to detect it. In this paper, we consider a general behavioral characterization of proximity malware. Behavioral characterization, in terms of system call and program flow, has been previously proposed as an effective alternative to pattern matching for malware detection [8] , [9] . In our model, malware-infected nodes' behaviors are observed by others during their multiple opportunistic encounters: Individual observations may be imperfect, but abnormal behaviors of infected nodes are identifiable in the long-run. For example, a single suspicious Bluetooth connection or SSH session request during one encounter does not confirm a Cabir or Ikee infection, but repetitive suspicious requests spanning multiple encounters is a strong indication for malware infection. The imperfection of a single, local observation was previously in the context of distributed IDS against slowly propagating worms [10] .
Instead of assuming a sophisticated malware containment capability, such as patching or self-healing [11] , [12] , we consider a simple "cut-off" strategy: If a node i suspects another node j of being infected with the malware, i simply ceases to connect with j in the future to avoid being infected by j. Our focus is on how individual nodes shall make such cut-off decisions against potentially malware-infected nodes, based on direct and indirect observations.
A comparable example from everyday experience is fire emergency. An early indication, like dark smoke, prompts two choices. One is to report fire emergency immediately; the other is to collect further evidence to make a better informed decision later. The first choice bears the cost of a false alarm, while the second choice risks missing the early window to contain the fire.
In the context of DTNs, we face a similar dilemma when trying to detect proximity malware: Hypersensitivity leads to false positives, while hyposensitivity leads to false negatives. In this paper, we present a simple, yet effective solution, look ahead, which naturally reflects individual nodes' intrinsic risk inclinations against malware infection, to balance between these two extremes. Essentially, we extend the naive Bayesian model, which has been applied in filtering email spams [13] , [14] , [15] , detecting botnets [16] , and designing IDSs [10] , [17] , and address two DTNspecific, malware-related, problems:
1. Insufficient evidence versus evidence collection risk. In DTNs, evidence (such as Bluetooth connection or SSH session requests) is collected only when nodes come into contact. But contacting malware-infected nodes carries the risk of being infected. Thus, nodes must make decisions (such as whether to cut off other nodes and, if yes, when) online based on potentially insufficient evidence. 2. Filtering false evidence sequentially and distributedly.
Sharing evidence among opportunistic acquaintances helps alleviating the aforementioned insufficient evidence problem; however, false evidence shared by malicious nodes (the liars) may negate the benefits of sharing. In DTNs, nodes must decide whether to accept received evidence sequentially and distributedly. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
1. We present a general behavioral characterization of proximity malware, which captures the functional but imperfect nature in detecting proximity malware (see Section 2). 2. Under the behavioral malware characterization, and with a simple cut-off malware containment strategy, we formulate the malware detection process as a distributed decision problem. We analyze the risk associated with the decision, and design a simple, yet effective, strategy, look ahead, which naturally reflects individual nodes' intrinsic risk inclinations against malware infection. Look ahead extends the naive Bayesian model, and addresses the DTNspecific, malware-related, "insufficient evidence versus evidence collection risk" problem (see Section 3.1).
3. We consider the benefits of sharing assessments among nodes, and address challenges derived from the DTN model: liars (i.e., bad-mouthing and falsepraising malicious nodes) and defectors (i.e., good nodes that have turned rogue due to malware infections). We present two alternative techniques, dogmatic filtering and adaptive look ahead, that naturally extend look ahead to consolidate evidence provided by others, while containing the negative effect of false evidence. A nice property of the proposed evidence consolidation methods is that the results will not worsen even if liars are the majority in the neighborhood (see Section 3.2). Real contact traces are used to verify the effectiveness of the methods (see Section 4).
MODEL
Consider a DTN consisting of n nodes. The neighbors of a node are the nodes it has (opportunistic) contact opportunities with. Proximity malware is a malicious program that disrupts the host node's normal function and has a chance of duplicating itself to other nodes during (opportunistic) contact opportunities between nodes in the DTN. When a duplication occurs, the other node is infected with the malware.
In our model, we assume that each node is capable of assessing the other party for suspicious actions after each encounter, resulting in a binary assessment. For example, a node can assess a Bluetooth connection or an SSH session for potential Cabir or Ikee infection. The watchdog components in previous works on malicious behavior detection in MANETs [18] and distributed reputation systems [19] , [20] are other examples. A node is either evil or good, based on if it is or is not infected by the malware. The suspiciousaction assessment is assumed to be an imperfect but functional indicator of malware infections: It may occasionally assess an evil node's actions as "nonsuspicious" or a good node's actions as "suspicious," but most suspicious actions are correctly attributed to evil nodes. A previous work on distributed IDS presents an example for such imperfect but functional binary classifier on nodes' behaviors [10] .
The functional assumption characterizes a malwareinfected node by the assessments of its neighbors. If node i has N (pairwise) encounters with its neighbors and s N of them are assessed as suspicious by the neighbors, its suspiciousness S i is defined as
By (1), S i 2 ½0; 1. A number L e 2 ð0; 1Þ is chosen as the line between good and evil. L e depends on the quality of a particular suspicious-action assessment and, if the assessment is a functional discriminant feature of the malware and the probabilistic distribution of the suspiciousness of both good and evil nodes are known, L e can be chosen as the (Bayesian) decision boundary, which minimizes classification errors [21] . Node i is good if S i L e , or evil if
We draw a fine line between good and evil, and judge a node by its deeds. Instead of assuming a sophisticated malware coping mechanism, such as patching or self-healing, we consider a simple and widely applicable malware containment strategy: Based on past assessments, a node i decides whether to refuse future connections ("cut off") with a neighbor j.
DESIGN
In the following discussion, we investigate the decision process of a node i, which has k neighbors fn 1 ; n 2 ; . . . ; n k g, against a neighbor j; with no loss of generality, let j be n 1 .
Household Watch
Consider the case in which i bases the cut-off decision against j only on i's own assessments on j. Since only direct assessments are involved, we call this model household watch (the naming will become more evident by the beginning of Section 3.2).
Let A ¼ ða 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a A Þ be the assessment sequence (a i is either 0 for "nonsuspicious" or 1 for "suspicious") in chronological order, i.e., a 1 is the oldest assessment, and a A is the newest one.
Bayes' theorem tells us
where P ðS j Þ encodes our prior belief on j's suspiciousness S j ; P ðA j S j Þ is the likelihood of observing the assessment sequence A given S j ; P ðS j j AÞ is the posterior probability, representing the plausibility of j having a suspiciousness of S j given the observed assessment sequence A. Since the evidence P ðAÞ does not involve S j and serves as a normalization factor in the computation, we omit it and write the quantitative relationship in the less cluttered proportional form. 
in which s A is the number of suspicious assessments in A. Fig. 1 shows the normalized posterior distributions P ðS j j AÞ for assessment samples with different sizes, given by (3). In each case, the ratio between suspicious and nonsuspicious assessments is the same, i.e., 1:3; by (4), S j ¼ 1 1þ3 ¼ 0:25 is the maximizer of P ðS j j AÞ, which is clearly shown in Fig. 1 . The distribution becomes sharper with a larger sample, which accords to the intuition of the increasing certainty on the suspiciousness S j .
The uncertainty over j's suspiciousness S j (and, hence, the risk of losing a good neighbor) holds i back from cutting j off immediately, based on insufficient evidence. In the following discussion, we consider two alternative approaches, distribution and maximizer, to handle the insufficient-evidence problem, based on (3) and (4), respectively.
In the distribution approach, i considers the whole posterior suspiciousness distribution (see (3)) in making the cut-off decision against j. From i's perspective, after observing an assessment sequence A, the probability P g ðAÞ that j is good is
the probability P e ðAÞ that j is evil is
be the (probability) normalization factor in (3); we have
and P e ðAÞ ¼ C
When P g ðAÞ ! P e ðAÞ, the evidence collected so far (i.e., A) is favorable to j. However, when P g ðAÞ < P e ðAÞ, the evidence is unfavorable to j and suggests that j might be an evil node. i needs to decide whether to cut j off.
The structure of the behavioral malware characterization model (specifically, a single threshold L e is used to distinguish the nature of a node) gives rise to a subtlety concerning i's prejudice against j in the distribution approach. By Section 1.2 of the online supplemental material, if i makes no presumption on j's suspiciousness, when no assessment has been made yet (i.e., A ¼ ;), (5) and (6), either P g ðAÞ < P e ðAÞ (if L E < 0:5) or P g ðAÞ > P e ðAÞ (if L E > 0:5). In other words, while i makes no presumption on j's suspiciousness, i may nevertheless be prejudiced against j by the distribution approach's decision rule.
1. When we use proportional form in this paper, we have implicitly done the same thing. Fig. 1 . The normalized posterior distribution P ðS j j AÞ for assessment samples with different sizes. The two numbers for each line in the legend show the number of suspicious and nonsuspicious assessments, respectively. In each case, the ratio between suspicious and nonsuspicious assessments is 1 : 3. All distributions have a maximal value at S j ¼ This leads to a discussion on whether such prejudices are warranted. The choice of L e depends on the assessment mechanism itself and, as mentioned previously, if the probabilistic distributions of suspiciousness of both good and evil nodes are known, can be determined by minimizing Bayesian decision errors. If L e > 0:5, the assessment mechanism is biased toward false positive (good nodes' actions being assessed as suspicious); if L e < 0:5, the assessment mechanism is biased toward false negative (evil nodes' actions being assessed as nonsuspicious). However, before any assessment is made, i has no clue about the true nature of j. A bias in the assessment mechanism should not affect the i's neutrality on j's nature before the first assessment is made. Thus, we stipulate that the comparison between P g ðAÞ and P e ðAÞ should be made only when A 6 ¼ ;.
Alternatively, in the maximizer approach, i uses the suspiciousness distribution's maximizer (see (4)) when making the cut-off decision against j. The justification for the maximizer approach is that the suspicious distribution's maximizer is the single most probable estimation of j's suspicisousness given the evidence. The maximizer approach precludes the prejudice problem, because the maximizer is undefined when A ¼ ;. Similar to the distribution approach, i compares evidence that is both favorable and unfavorable to j. Evidence A is favorable to j if s A =jAj L e and is unfavorable to j if s A =jAj > L e . The maximizer approach significantly reduces the computation cost, in comparison with the distribution approach, while partially discarding information contained in the suspiciousness distribution derivable from the evidence collected so far.
Whichever approach is taken, the cut-off decision problem has an asymmetric structure in the sense that cutting j off will immediately terminate the decision process (i.e., i will cease connecting with j; no further evidence will be collected), while the opposite decision will not. Thus, we only need to consider the decision problem when i considers cutting j off due to unfavorable evidence against j.
The cut-off decision is made based on the risk estimation of such a decision. The key insight is that i shall estimate the cut-off decision's risk by looking ahead.
More specifically, given the current assessment sequence A ¼ ða 1 ; . . . ; a A Þ, the next assessment a Aþ1 (which has not been taken yet) might be either 0 (nonsuspicious) or 1 (suspicious). Let A 0 ¼ ðA; a Aþ1 Þ. If a Aþ1 ¼ 1, by Section 1.3 of the online supplemental material, either P g ðA 0 Þ < P g ðAÞ < P e ðAÞ < P e ðA 0 Þ (the distribution approach) or s A 0 =jA 0 j ¼ ð1 þ s A Þ=ð1 þ jAjÞ > s A =jAj > L e (the maximizer approach): The evidence against j becomes more unfavorable.
However, if a Aþ1 ¼ 0, the evidence might become either favorable or unfavorable to j. If the evidence is still unfavorable toward j, we say that i's decision of cutting j off is one-step-ahead robust. If the cut-off decision is one-stepahead robust, i is certain that exposing itself to the potential danger of infection by collecting one further assessment on j will not change the outlook that j is evil.
Similarly, i can look multiple steps ahead. In fact, the number of steps i is willing to look ahead is a parameter of the decision process rather than a result of it. This parameter shows i's willingness to be exposed to a higher infection risk in exchange for a higher certainty about the nature of j and a lower risk of cutting off a good neighbor; in other words, it reflects i's intrinsic risk inclination against malware infection.
Definition 1 (Look-Ahead ). The look-ahead is the number of steps i is willing to look ahead before making a cut-off decision.
We can make a similar decision-robustness definition for look-ahead .
Definition 2 (-Robustness). At a particular point in i's cutoff decision process against j (with assessment sequence A ¼ ða 1 ; . . . ; a A ÞÞ, i's decision of cutting j off is said to be -step-ahead robust, or simply -robust, if 1) the current evidence A is unfavorable toward j; and 2) even if the next assessments ða Aþ1 ; . . . ; a Aþ ÞÞ all turn out to be nonsuspicious (i.e., 0), the evidence against j is still unfavorable.
Given the look-ahead , the proposed malware containment strategy is to cut j off if the cut-off decision is -robust, and not to cut j off otherwise.
In Section 2 of the online supplemental material, we discuss how to adapt the look-ahead to individual nodes' intrinsic risk inclinations against the malware.
Neighborhood Watch
Besides using i's own assessments, i may incorporate other neighbors' assessments in the cut-off decision against j. This extension to the evidence collection process is inspired by the real-life neighborhood (crime) watch program, which encourages residents to report suspicious criminal activities in their neighborhood. Similarly, i shares assessments on j with its neighbors, and receives their assessments on j in return.
In the neighborhood-watch model, the malicious nodes that are able to transmit malware (we will see next that there may be malicious nodes whose objective is other than transmitting malware) are assumed to be consistent over space and time. These are common assumptions in distributed trust management systems (summarized in Section 5), which incorporate neighboring nodes' opinions in estimating a local trust value.
By being consistent over space, we mean that evil nodes' suspicious actions are observable to all their neighbors, rather than only a few. If this is not the case, the evidence provided by neighbors, even if truthful, will contradict local evidence and, hence, cause confusions: Nodes shall discard received evidence and fall back to the household watch model.
By being consistent over time, we mean that evil nodes cannot play strategies to fool the assessment mechanism. This is equivalent to the functional assumption in characterizing the nature of nodes by suspiciousness (see (1) ). The case in which the evil nodes can circumvent the suspiciousness characterization (such as by first accumulating good assessments, and then launch an attack through a short burst of concentrated suspicious actions) calls for game-theoretic analysis and design, and is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we propose a behavioral characterization of proximity malware; further gametheoretic analysis and design could base on this foundation.
Challenges
Two cases complicate the neighborhood watch model: liars and defectors.
Liars are those evil nodes who confuse other nodes by sharing false assessments. A false assessment is either a false praise or a false accusation. False praises understate evil nodes' suspiciousness, while false accusations exaggerate good nodes' suspiciousness. Furthermore, a liar can fake assessments on nodes that it has never met with. To hide their true nature, liars may do no evil other than lying, and, therefore, have low suspiciousness.
Defectors are those nodes that change their nature due to malware infections. They start out as good nodes and faithfully share assessments with their neighbors; however, due to malware infections, they become evil. Their behaviors after the infection are under the control of the malware.
These complications call for evidence consolidation. Two extremal, but naive, evidence-consolidation strategies are 1) to trust no one and 2) to trust everyone. The former degenerates to the household-watch model with the twist of the defectors (defectors change their nature and hence their behavioral pattern); the latter leads to confusions among good nodes.
Evidence
For a pair of neighboring nodes i and j, let N i and N j be the neighbors of i and j, respectively. At each encounter, i shares with j its assessments on the neighbor set N i À fjg, and j shares with i its assessments on the neighbor set
Since the cut-off decision only needs to be made against a neighbor, i only considers the assessments of its own neighbors N i \ ðN j À figÞ from the evidence provided by j. Without superimposed trust relationships among the nodes in the model, i and j only share their own assessments, instead of forwarding the ones provided by their neighbors.
Evidence Aging
The presence of defectors breaks the assumption when we characterize a node's nature by suspiciousness in (1). A defector starts as a good node but turns evil due to malware infections; the assessments collected before the defector's change of nature, even truthful, are misleading.
To alleviate the problem of outdated assessments, old assessments are discarded in a process called evidence aging. Each assessment is associated with a timestamp. Only assessments with timestamps less than a specific aging window T E from now are included in the cut-off decision.
To see that the aging window T E alleviates the defector problem, consider a node that is infected at time T . Without evidence aging, all evidence before T mounts to testify that the node is good; if the amount of this prior evidence is large, it may take a long time for its neighbors to find out about the change in its nature. In comparison, with evidence aging, at time T þ T E , all prior evidence expires and only those assessments after the infection are considered, which collectively testify against the node.
However, in practice, the choice of the aging window T E depends on the context. While a small T E may speed up the detection of defectors by reducing the impact of stale information, T E must be large enough to accommodate enough assessments to make a sound cut-off decision. If T E is too small, a node will not have enough assessments to make an -robust cut-off decision.
Evidence Consolidation
We propose two alternative methods, dogmatic filtering and adaptive look ahead, for consolidating evidence provided by other nodes, while containing the negative impact of liars. For exposition, we consider a scenario in which node i uses the assessments within the evidence aging window ½T À T E ; T provided by i's neighbors (other than one of the neighbors, say, j) in making the cut-off decision against j.
The following observation inspires our solution: Given enough assessments, i is more likely to correctly estimate j's suspiciousness than otherwise. Consider a simple numerical illustration. If j has in total 4 suspicious actions and 12 nonsuspicious actions assessed by its neighbors, its (true) suspiciousness is Þ; a straightforward calculation shows that the number is maximized when x ¼ 1. In other words, i is more likely to estimate j to be 1 1þ3 ¼ 0:25, which agrees with the true suspiciousness, compared to otherwise.
In general, suppose j has been assessed n times by its neighbors, and s of them are suspicious. Its suspicisousness, by definition, is . Given enough assessments, honest nodes are likely to obtain a close estimation of a node's suspiciousness (suppose they have not cut the node off yet), even if they only use their own assessments. . The liars have to share a significant amount of false evidence to sway the public's opinion on a node's suspiciousness. . The most susceptible victims of liars are the nodes that have little evidence. Dogmatic filtering. Dogmatic filtering is based on the observation that one's own assessments are truthful and, therefore, can be used to bootstrap the evidence consolidation process. A node shall only accept evidence that will not sway its current opinion too much. We call this observation the dogmatic principle.
Our interpretation of the dogmatic principle depends on the following generalization of Definition 2.
Definition 3 (-Robust Judgment). Let A be the suspiciousaction assessments that i has on j. We say that i's judgment on j's nature is -robust (or ðÀÞ-robust) based on A, if 1) the evidence A is favorable (or unfavorable) toward j, 2) the evidence remains so even if the next assessments are all suspicious (or nonsuspicious), and 3) the evidence becomes unfavorable (or favorable) toward j if the next þ 1 assessments are all suspicious (or nonsuspicious). As a special case, if a judgment is not even 1-robust (or ðÀ1Þ-robust), we say that the judgment is 0-robust or not robust at all. -robust judgment reflects i's certainty of its judgment on j's nature (based on the evidence collected so far). Therobust cut-off decision against j (see Definition 2) is equivalent to the ðÀÞ-robust judgment on the (evil) nature of j. The sign of in Definition 3 represents j's nature: A negative number represents evilness, and a positive number represents goodness.
i's cut-off decision against j works as follows with dogmatic filtering.
. i will not consider cutting j off until i has at least one assessment on j. . After its first encounter with j and with its own assessments A with the evidence aging window ½T À T E ; T , i considers whether or not to take another neighbor k's alleged assessments on j within the same window B when i and k meet. . Suppose that the judgment on j's nature is Arobust and ðAþBÞ -robust, based on A and ðA þ BÞ, respectively. i will take B only if A 6 ¼ 0 and j A À ðAþBÞ j j A j ; > 0 and is called the dogmatism. . i makes a -robust cut-off decision against j, based on either A or ðA þ BÞ, depending on whether B has passed the dogmatism test. With dogmatic filtering, i is very conservative when its certainty about j's nature is still low (i.e., A is small). At this early stage, i will accept the evidence provided by j only if the evidence would not significantly change its certainty on j's nature. In particular, if 1, i will never accept a piece of evidence that would change its judgment on j's nature because j A À ðAþBÞ j > j A j if A and ðA þ BÞ are of different signs. Dogmatic filtering significantly contains the impact of liars on i while still allowing a change of certainty (on j's nature) comparable to its own. The aforementioned observation that the liars have to fabricate a significant amount of false evidence to confuse honest nodes means that the evidence B provided by a liar k must have a high B (albeit of the wrong sign) to be effective in confusing i. The liar's strategy will not work because i will refuse to take B when j A j is small with dogmatic filtering, while A and B should be of different signs when A is large (because by then, i should have a close estimation of j's true suspiciousness, and hence, A is of the correct sign). The evidence filtering works even when the liars are the majority among i's neighbors.
Adaptive look ahead. Adaptive look ahead takes a different approach toward evidence consolidation. Instead of deciding whether to use the evidence provided by others directly in the cut-off decision, adaptive lookhead indirectly uses the evidence by adapting the steps to look ahead to the diversity of opinion.
Adaptive look-ahead works as follows:
. Suppose that at a particular moment, the distribution maximizer derived from the assessments (within the evidence aging window) on j (see (4)) made by i is s 0 ; similarly, the distribution maximizer derived from the assessments (within the evidence aging window) on j that i received from its neighbors is s 1 ; s 2 ; . . . ; s n . . i computes the following egocentric variance i as a metric on the diversity of opinions (from its own assessments):
. Let the maximal egocentric variance up to (and including) now be Ã i (thus, we have i Ã i ). i makes its cut-off decision against j if the decision is fð i ; Ã i ; Þ-robust, where fðÁ; Á; ÁÞ is a three-parameter integer function ranging from 0 to , which we call the adaptive-look-ahead function. A particular instantiation is the linear adaptive look-ahead function:
The idea of adaptive look ahead is to adapt the risk inclination, embodied in the -robust cut-off decision in Definition 2, to the diversity of public opinions, embodied in the ego-centric variance in (9) . The dogmatism principle underlies the use of the egocentric variance: The agreement of the public's opinions with that of i is an indication that i is approaching the true suspiciousness; thus, to expedite the detection of evil nodes (and hence reduce the risk of infection from further contact), i reduces the steps to look ahead in making the cut-off decision.
Because the value of the adaptive-look-ahead function is no greater than 1, the worst that liars can do is to degenerate i's cut-off decision to a -robust one. Also, since i has a chance of estimating a close-to-true suspiciousness than otherwise, liars' false opinions are likely to be different from that of i, and good nodes' opinions are likely to agree with that of i. Thus, i will be more proactive if good nodes make up the majority of its neighborhood and less so if the liars are the majority.
SIMULATION
Data Sets
We verify our design with two real mobile network traces: Haggle [22] and MIT reality [23] .
The raw data sets are rich in information, some of which is irrelevant to our study, for example, call logs and cell tower IDs in MIT reality. Therefore, we remove the irrelevant fields and retain the node IDs and time-stamps for each pairwise node encounter. Since the Haggle data set has only 22,459 entries spanning over three days, we repeat it another four times to make it into a data set with 112,295 entries spanning over 15 days, and thus make it comparable to the MIT reality data set in quantity. Some statistics of the processed data sets are summarized in Table 1 .
Setup
Without loss of generality, we choose L e ¼ 0:5 to be the line between good and evil. For each data set, we randomly pick 10 percent of the nodes to be the evil nodes and assign them with suspiciousness greater than 0.5; the rest of the nodes are good nodes and are assigned suspiciousness less than 0.5.
For a particular pairwise encounter, a uniform random number is generated for each node; a node receives a "suspicious" assessment (by the other node) if the random number is greater than its suspiciousness and receives a "nonsuspicious" assessment otherwise. Thus, each assessment is binary, while the frequency of "suspicious" assessments for a particular node reflects its suspiciousness in the long term.
Performance Metric
The performance comparison is based on two metrics: detection rate and false positive rate. The categories of the "neighbor's nature" and "cut-off decision" combinations are shown in Table 2 . For each combination, we sum up all the decisions made by good nodes (evil nodes' cut-off decisions are irrelevant) and obtain four counts: T P (true positives), F N (false negatives), T N (true negatives), and F P (false positives). The detection rate DR is defined as
and the false positive rate F P R is defined as
A high detection rate and a low false positive rate are desirable. When a balance must be stricken between the two, one might be emphasized over the other, depending on the context.
Results
Look Ahead: Distribution versus Maximizer
We compare the two alternative approaches, distribution and maximizer, to the look-ahead strategy (see Section 3.1). The results are shown in Fig. 2 .
The look-ahead parameter reflects a node's intrinsic (infection) risk inclination. In both Haggle (see Figs. 2a and 2b) and MIT reality (see Figs. 2c and 2d) , the -robust cutoff strategy with a larger corresponds to a higher detection rate (in the early stage for Haggle and throughout for MIT reality) and a significantly lower false positive rate (for both data sets). In Haggle, the eventual detection rates for all three look-ahead parameters are close to 100 percent. The difference in the eventual detection rate between Haggle and MIT reality is attributed to the different contact patterns in these data sets: The contact pattern in Haggle is more homogeneous than that in MIT reality, in the sense that the variation of the interval between encounters is significantly higher and a few nodes contribute most of the assessments in MIT reality. Thus, the detection rate is more sensitive to the change of in MIT reality than in Haggle.
In both data sets, the detection-rate and false-positive rate are comparable for the distribution and maximizer approach, with the distribution approach having a slightly higher detection rate and false-positive rate. The small difference in performance, coupled with the significant reduction in computation overhead (integration for the distribution approach versus arithmetic operations for the maximizer approach), make the maximizer approach with a moderate as the preferred look-ahead strategy. In the following sections, we show results for the maximizer approach with ¼ 3. 
Look Ahead
We compare Bayesian-based strategies with, and without, the look-ahead extension (i.e., -robust cut-off decision) under the household-watch model (i.e., no evidence exchange). The vanilla Bayesian strategy does not look ahead and proceeds with cutting-off once the evidence becomes unfavorable to the neighbor. It can be seen as a degenerated -robust cut-off strategy with ¼ 0. The results are shown in Fig. 3 .
In Fig. 3 , the vanilla Bayesian strategy has the highest detection and false-positive rate. Both rates drop with an increasing look-ahead parameter. However, the falsedetection rate drops much faster than the detection rate. Indeed, for Haggle, the 1-robust and the vanilla Bayesian strategies have almost the same detection rate after 30,000 encounters, but there is a 30 percent difference in the falsepositive rate. The difference in detection rate is more pronounced for MIT reality, but the reduction in falsepositive rate far outweighs that of detection rate. For the risk-taking nodes, sacrificing a little detection rate for a large reduction in false-positive rate is desirable: the lookahead parameter provides an effective mechanism to tune for a desirable balance.
The results confirm the intuition that leads to the lookahead extension to the vanilla Bayesian strategy: Being conservative in making cut-off decisions (by looking ahead) pays off by retaining utility without sacrificing much security.
Evidence Consolidation
We also evaluate the benefits of sharing assessments among nodes, and the effect of the proposed evidence consolidation strategies in minimizing the negative impact of liars on the shared evidence's quality. We compare the dogmatic filtering (with dogmatism of 0.0001, 0.01, and 1, respectively) and adaptive look-ahead evidence consolidation methods with two other (naive) evidence consolidation methods: 1) taking no indirect evidence, i.e., look ahead with no evidence consolidation, and 2) taking all indirect evidence without filtering.
In our study, 10 percent of the evil nodes play the dual roles of evil-doers and liars. There are many possible liar strategies. Based on our observations in Section 3.2.4, we adopt an exaggerated false praise/accusation liar strategy. More specifically, a liar (falsely) accuses good nodes of suspicious actions and (falsely) praises other evil nodes for nonsuspicious actions. Besides, to exert a significant influence on the public opinion, they exaggerate the false praises/ accusations by 10 times (since they are only 10 percent of the whole population). The results on the performance of various evidence consolidation strategies under this setting are shown in Fig. 4 . Fig. 4 clearly shows the negative impact of liars on malware detection if evidence is not filtered: Under the influence of liars, the naive "all" strategy has a lowdetection rate and a high false-positive rate. This calls for a nontrivial evidence consolidation strategy to deal with the liars. Both dogmatic filtering and adaptive look ahead show significant increases in detection rate and modest increases in false positive rate over the baseline 3-robust look-ahead strategy with no evidence filtering. Together with Fig. 3 , the results indicate that the 3-robust look ahead, with either dogmatic filtering or adaptive look ahead, is comparable in detection rate and, even in the presence of liars, shows a significantly lower false positive rate in comparison with both the Bayesian and 1-robust strategies.
In Fig. 4 , the eventual detection rates converge to almost 100 percent for Haggle but diverge for MIT reality. The convergence in detection rate is expected for a homogeneous data set like Haggle, in which most nodes are well connected and are able to collect enough evidence to eventually make a sound cut-off decision. In this case, evidence consolidation helps to expedite the decisionmaking process without driving the false-positive rate up too much. A closer look at MIT reality indicates that this data set is highly heterogeneous: A few well-connected nodes contribute most of the assessments, and leave the other less well-connected nodes with insufficient evidence to make a -robust judgment alone. In this case, evidence consolidation helps the latter nodes in collecting enough evidence to make a -robust decision.
Two of the dogmatic filtering strategies (with a dogmatism of 0.01 and 0.0001) show almost the same performance, with the other dogmatic filtering strategy (with a dogmatism of 1) show a slight difference in comparison with other strategies. In both data sets, the adaptive look-ahead strategy shows an inferior performance in comparison to the three variations of the dogmatic filtering strategy. However, it automatically (i.e., with no parameter to tune) achieves superior detection rate over both Bayesian and 3-robust strategies in the presence of liars.
RELATED WORK
Proximity malware and mitigation schemes. Su et al. [24] collected Bluetooth traces and demonstrated that malware could effectively propagate via Bluetooth with simulations. Yan et al. [25] developed a Bluetooth malware model. Bose and Shin [26] showed that Bluetooth can enhance malware propagation rate over SMS/MMS. Cheng et al. [27] analyzed malware propagation through proximity channels in social networks. Akritidis et al. [4] quantified the threat of proximity malware in wide-area wireless networks. Li et al. [28] discussed optimal malware signature distribution in heterogeneous, resource-constrained mobile networks. In traditional, non-DTN, networks, Kolbitsch et al. [8] and Bayer et al. [9] proposed to detect malware with learned behavioral model, in terms of system call and program flow. We extend the Naive Bayesian model, which has been applied in filtering email spams [13] , [14] , [15] , detecting botnets [16] , and designing IDSs [10] , [17] , and address DTN-specific, malware-related, problems. In the context of detecting slowly propagating Internet worm, Dash et al. presented a distributed IDS architecture of local/global detector that resembles the neighborhood-watch model, with the assumption of attested/honest evidence, i.e., without liars [10] .
Mobile network models and traces. In mobile networks, one cost-effective way to route packets is via the short-range channels of intermittently connected smartphones [29] , [30] , [31] . While early work in mobile networks used a variety of simplistic random i.i.d. models, such as random waypoint, recent findings [32] show that these models may not be realistic. Moreover, many recent studies [33] , based on real mobile traces, revealed that a node's mobility shows certain social network properties. Two real mobile network traces were used in our study.
Reputation and trust in networking systems. In the neighborhood watch model, suspiciousness, defined in (1), can be seen as nodes' reputation; to cut a node off is to decide that the node is not trustworthy. Thus, our work can be viewed from the perspective of reputation/trust systems. Three schools of thoughts emerge from previous studies. The first one uses a central authority, which by convention is called the trusted third party. In the second school, one global trust value is drawn and published for each node, based on other nodes' opinions of it; eigenTrust [34] is an example. The last school of thoughts includes the trust management systems that allow each node to have its own view of other nodes [35] , [36] . Our work differs from previous trust management work in addressing two DTNspecific, malware-related, trust management problems: 1) insufficient evidence versus evidence collection risk and 2) sequential and distributed online evidence filtering.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Behavioral characterization of malware is an effective alternative to pattern matching in detecting malware, especially when dealing with polymorphic or obfuscated malware. Naive Bayesian model has been successfully applied in non-DTN settings, such as filtering email spams and detecting botnets. We propose a general behavioral characterization of DTN-based proximity malware. We present look ahead, along with dogmatic filtering and adaptive look ahead, to address two unique challenging in extending Bayesian filtering to DTNs: "insufficient evidence versus evidence collection risk" and "filtering false evidence sequentially and distributedly." In prospect, extension of the behavioral characterization of proximity malware to account for strategic malware detection evasion with game theory is a challenging yet interesting future work.
